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Abstract
Food labels legislated by the U.S. government have been designed to provide information to consumers. It has been asserted 
that the simple disclosures “produced using genetic engineering” on newly legislated U.S. food labels will send a signal that 
influences individual preferences rather than providing information. Vermont is the only US state to have experienced man-
datory labeling of foods produced using genetic engineering (GE) via simple disclosures. Using a representative sample of 
adults who experienced Vermont’s mandatory GE labeling policy, we examined whether GE labels were seen by consumers 
and whether the labels provided information or influenced preferences. Nearly one-third of respondents reported seeing a 
label. Higher income, younger consumers who search for information about GE were more likely to report seeing a label. 
We also estimated whether labels served as information cues that helped reveal consumer preferences through purchases, or 
whether labels served as a signal that influenced preferences and purchases. For 50.5% of consumers who saw a label, the 
label served as an information cue that revealed their preferences. For 13% of those who saw the label, the label influenced 
preferences and behavior. Overall, for 4% of the total sample, simple GE disclosures influenced preferences. For a slight 
majority of consumers who used a GE label, simple disclosures were an information signal and not a preference signal. 
Searching for GE information, classifying as female, older age and opposing GE in food production significantly increased 
the probability that GE labels served as an information source. Providing such disclosures to consumers may be the least 
complex and most transparent option for mandatory GE labeling.




CATI  Computer aided telephone interview
FDA  Food and drug administration
GE  Genetically engineered
GM  Genetically modified
GMO  Genetically modified organism
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture
WTP  Willingness to pay
Introduction
Labels play a significant role in facilitating consumer choice 
in the case of credence goods; goods for which consumers 
cannot determine through search nor experience whether a 
product contains an attribute or quality they prefer (Caswell 
1998; Caswell and Mojduszka 1996; Fulton and Giannakas 
2016). Credence characteristics can impact the liking of food 
(Fernqvist and Ekelund 2014).
Labels typically provide information to consumers about 
a desired or undesired attribute, without changing their pref-
erence for that attribute (Nelson 1970, 1974). However, it 
has been asserted that “produced using genetic engineering” 
labels not only provide consumers with information, but may 
also send a signal that influences individual preferences. If 
labels signal more than information by influencing consumer 
preferences either for or against Genetically engineered (GE) 
foods, consumers lose autonomy and self-determination in 
their decision making (Siipi and Uusitalo 2011).
 * Jane Kolodinsky 
 Jane.Kolodinsky@uvm.edu
 Sean Morris 
 Sean.Morris@uvm.edu
 Orest Pazuniak 
 Orest.Pazuniak@uvm.edu
1 CDAE, University of Vermont, Morrill Hall, Burlington, 
VT 05405, USA
118 J. Kolodinsky et al.
1 3
Vermont is the only US state to have experienced man-
datory labeling of foods produced using GE. Simple dis-
closures, “produced using genetic engineering” or “par-
tially produced using genetic engineering,” were required 
on foods during July of 2016. Federal labeling legislation, 
signed into law by President Obama on 27 July 2016, super-
seded all pending state legislation (A bill: S. 764 2016). 
However, labels on packaged goods persisted for months 
and are still seen on a variety of food packaging. In early 
May of 2018 the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) released a set of proposed disclosure labeling rules 
for genetically modified foods. These proposed rules include 
five main disclosure alternatives, only one of which is a 
simple text disclosure on packaging (USDA n.d.). The new 
language also changes the abbreviations GE, GM, or GMO 
to BE for bio-engineered. Because this study examined labe-
ling before USDA’s suggested wording change to BE, this 
paper uses GE nomenclature.
Using a representative sample of adults who experi-
enced Vermont’s GE labeling policy, this study is designed 
to answer two research questions: who saw the mandatory 
labels and, given a label was seen, was the label an informa-
tional signal or a signal that influenced preferences? This 
research contributes to the food labeling in general, and GE 
literature specifically. It is the first study to utilize data on 
mandatory GE labels in the United States to identify con-
sumer characteristics associated with seeing “contains GE” 
in the actual marketplace. Additionally, importantly, the 
study examines characteristics of respondents associated 
with using label information to reveal preferences and char-
acteristics associated with using labels to form preferences. 
This information is useful to policy makers currently design-
ing both the federally legislated mandatory label symbol and 
associated label disclosure.
Literature review
The empirical literature presents mixed findings about 
the informational versus signaling impact of GE labels on 
consumer attitudes and/or preferences. Even less is known 
about how labels will impact consumer purchase decisions. 
Because the US marketplace has not experienced mandatory 
GE labeling, all research has been hypothetical, with the 
exception of Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018).
Hu et al. (2005) conducted experiments on the telephone 
with respondents to assess consumer utility for labeled or 
non-labeled GM bread products and found that a hypo-
thetical mandatory labeling requirement resulted in higher 
consumer utility. Two controlled experiments concerning 
hypothetical consumption choices conducted by Costanigro 
and Lusk (2014) concluded that the signaling effects of GE 
labels on two types of foods were minimal and likely too 
small to be able to consistently detect. Similarly, Kolodinsky 
(2008) found that rBST labeling on milk provided cognitive 
information instead of sending signals associated with sub-
jective feelings. Bansal et al. (2013) used an experimental 
auction approach in India and found that the informational 
cue of labeling was stronger than any negative signaling cue.
Research has also found labels to be a signal that influ-
ences attitudes and/or preferences. Huffman et al. (2003) 
used an auction-based experiment to conclude that labeling 
bias had a significant impact on participant decision making. 
Kanter et al. (2009) present experimental evidence that labe-
ling non-rBST milk produced a stigma effect that reduced 
consumers’ willingness to purchase conventional milk. Lusk 
and Rozan (2008) conducted a mail survey to elaborate an 
econometric model which demonstrated that consumers who 
believed that the US government had a mandatory labeling 
policy were more likely to believe that GM food was unsafe. 
Comparing the mandatory labeling requirements in the EU 
with the voluntary requirements in Canada, Gruère et al. 
(2008) conclude that mandatory labeling may actually have 
removed consumer choice because high costs of segmenting 
may have reinforced bias against foods with GE. Bukenya 
and Wright (2007) found similar results. In the only study 
of actual mandatory labeling situation in the US, Kolod-
insky and Lusk (2018) compared Vermonters’ opinions 
of GE foods with a national control group of respondents 
from regions outside of Vermont and New England before 
and after the enactment of the Vermont legislation. After 
controlling for key demographic characteristics, their differ-
ence-in-difference model found that Vermonter opposition 
towards GE technologies in food production decreased by 
19%. That is, Vermonters were less opposed to GE after the 
mandatory labeling law went into effect.
While the above studies highlight labels as an infor-
mational cue or preference shifting signal, there is scant 
research on how information or signals translate into con-
sumer behavior. Cook et al. (2002) found that a positive 
10% change in attitude reduced the number of people with a 
strong intention not to purchase GE foods by 10.08%. Vec-
chione et al. (2014) found significant correlations between 
attitudes and behavior, and knowledge and behavior. Will-
ingness to pay (WTP) studies using either survey or experi-
mental approaches consistently find that consumers require 
a discount to purchase foods produced using GE. The gen-
eral finding across studies is a lower WTP for GE goods 
when compared to non-GE goods ranging from 1 to 21% 
and $0.023 to $0.90 per unit of respective product (Bruno 
and Campbell 2016; Bukenya and Wright 2007; Colson et al. 
2011; Huffman et al. 2003; Wachenheim and VanWechel 
2004). While a premium for non-GM goods is common, 
between 32 and 53% of consumers are never willing to pay 
any premium (Bruno and Campbell 2016; Loureiro and Bug-
bee 2005; Loureiro and Hine 2002). However, whether a 
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label acts as an information cue that reveals preferences for 
non-GE alternatives or serves as a signal that forms prefer-
ences is not known from experimental WTP studies that 
introduce hypothetical labeling scenarios. Did the labels 
change preferences and lead to a lower WTP? Or, did the 
labels serve as an informational cue that revealed less prefer-
ence and thus lower WTP for GE foods?
To date, there is no consistent answer in the literature 
as to whether mandatory GE labels provide information or 
send a signal that changes preferences. In short, we know 
little about how labeling policy actually impacts consumer 
choices. This study seeks to fill this void using data from 
Vermont, the only US example of mandatory “produced or 
partially produced using genetic engineering” disclosures.
Conceptual model
The study of consumer behavior has long recognized the 
importance of both cognition and affect on choice (see, for 
example, Peter and Olson 2009). Cognition refers to think-
ing, including knowledge and beliefs about a product. Affect 
refers to feelings, including liking and disliking a product. 
There are several other significant theoretical perspectives 
commonly employed to examine the impact of mandatory 
GE labels on consumer behavior. First, we consider con-
sumer autonomy theory, which draws from philosophical 
ethics and emphasizes the role of free choice in consumer 
decision making (Beauchamp 2005; Beauchamp and Chil-
dress 2001; Markie 2007; Siipi and Uusitalo 2008). Auton-
omous choice is one in which a consumer refers to their 
self-determination to make choices in the marketplace. 
Autonomy assumes authenticity; that is, authentic desires 
come without coercion or influence (Siipi and Uusitalo 
2011). This is not incongruent with revealed preference 
theory in microeconomics in which preferences are given in 
a choice situation and are revealed through purchase (Samu-
elson 1938).
Both the ideas of autonomy and revealed preferences 
allow empirical modeling with choice as the outcome, and 
both assume that preferences are given and drive choice 
behavior. Neither theory stipulates that choices made are 
inherently “good” or “bad,” only that consumer preferences 
are the basis of choice. A third theory is stigma theory, 
rooted in transdisciplinary risk theory and found in the fields 
of sociology, marketing, communication, and consumer 
behavior (see, for example: Ellen and Bone 2008; Gregory 
et al. 2001; Link and Phelan 2001; Scholderer and Frewer 
2003). Stigma implies a negative reaction by consumers. 
For example, if a label implies a product is risky, consum-
ers may not make a purchase. Given the possibility of both 
stigma and reassurance of labels, we must not assume that 
consumers will only have negative reactions to a product 
characteristic, but also consider the possibility that labels 
might have the opposite effect, as found by Kolodinsky and 
Lusk (2018).
We conceptualize the above discussion into the model in 
Fig. 1. Environmental variables, including consumer demo-
graphics, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, experience with 
labels, and search behavior impact whether or not people 
observe a GE label. Given a label is observed, there are 
three paths. The first is that the label influences consumer 
attitudes, either stigmatizing or reassuring them about GE 
technologies used in food production. In this scenario, labels 
Fig. 1  Model of impact of GE 
labels on consumer decision 
making
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form consumer preferences and influence behavior. The sec-
ond path is that labels inform consumers that the product 
was produced using GE. It does not form their preferences, 
but helps to reveal preferences, prompting the consumer to 
either choose or avoid the product. The third path is that 
the label is observed but is of no consequence in a purchase 
decision.
Data
Our study uses data from a survey of Vermont residents 
conducted in the fall of 2016 and the spring of 2017. The 
study was approved by the institutional review board of the 
University. All interviewers were trained and administered 
computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI). Response data 
were secured electronically on a password-protected server 
at the University of Vermont. The sample of called respond-
ents was drawn using area code exchanges for landlines and 
cellphones in Vermont. Respondents who were not currently 
living in Vermont or under the age of 18 were screened out. 
Follow-up calls were placed at various days and times of 
the week if there was a busy signal or no answer. Any given 
phone number was called a maximum of three times. Con-
sistent with current trends in phone subscriptions, a majority 
of the respondents (64.0%) were reached on a cell phone.
A total of 1034 responses were collected; 942 respond-
ents had complete information required for the multivari-
ate analysis. The results based on a group size of 942 have 
a margin of error of ± 3.19% with a confidence interval 
of 95%. The sample is similar to Vermont with regard to 
income distribution, gender, race, and ethnicity. As is typical 
with phone surveys, the sample is older and more educated 
than the general population. Telephone surveys still reach a 
large portion of the population (Marken 2018). A majority 
of respondents were either opposed or very opposed to the 
use of GM in food production, about one-fifth were neu-
tral, and a little over one-fifth were supportive. More than 
half of all respondents identified GM as a “transfer of genes 
that would not occur in nature,” a modified version of the 
definition used by the World Health Organization (2014).1 
Almost a quarter of respondents reported that they search for 
information about GE (active search), while almost one-half 
reported paying attention to information if it “catches their 
eye” (passive search). A majority of respondents consult 
front of package labels, use ingredient lists, utilize nutri-
tion information, and notice organic and natural labels on 
foods. Table 1 provides a summary of key demographic and 
response characteristics for the respondents.
Figure 2 identifies the paths taken by the sample of 
respondents with regard to seeing a label, whether the label 
Table 1  Summary statistics for selected demographic and response
Variable Proportion
Data collection period (n = 942)
 Fall 2016 41.4%
 Spring 2017 58.6%
Gender (n = 942)
 Female 52.7%
 Male 47.3%
Age (continuous) (n = 942) 54.9
 Standard deviation 16.6
Education (n = 942)
 Less than a bachelor’s degree 49.2%
 Bachelor’s degree or more 50.8%
Income (n = 942)
 Income less than $50,000 44.7%
 Income greater than $50,000 55.3%
Hispanic/Latino (n = 923)
 Not Hispanic/Latino 98.2%
 Hispanic/Latino 1.8%
Race (n = 903)
 White 96.9%
 American Indian or Eskimo 1.3%
 Black or African American 1.0%
 Asian or Pacific Islander 0.8%
 Some other race 0.0%
In a family with children (n = 942)
 In a family with children 28.7%
 Not in a family with children 71.3%
Support of GMOs in food supply (n = 916)
 Strongly support 6.1%
 Somewhat support 15.7%
 Have no opinion 21.4%
 Somewhat oppose 24.0%
 Strongly oppose 32.8%
Identify GM (n = 942)
 Identify GM as “Transfer of genes that would not 
occur in nature”
55.5%
 Identify GM as “Transfer of genes that would/might 
occur in nature”
44.5%
Search attributes (n = 942)
 Active search 22.9%
 Passive search 47.2%
 Consults product info on front of package 52.3%
 Consults ingredient list 79.7%
 Consults nutrition information 80.8%
 Notices organic food label 59.3%
 Notices “natural” food label 51.0%
1 WHO defines genetically modified foods as: “organisms (i.e. plants, 
animals or microorganisms) in which the genetic material (DNA) has 
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or 
natural recombination.”
121How consumers use mandatory genetic engineering (GE) labels: evidence from Vermont 
1 3
was an information cue that revealed preferences or a signal 
that changed attitudes which led to behavior.
Statistical model
This analysis used Heckman’s (1979) sample selection 
model to examine whether an individual saw a label and, 
if so, whether and how purchasing behaviors changed as 
a result. To do this, a categorical “preference/choice cat-
egory” variable was constructed to specify three groups 
Fig. 2  Breakdown of respondents who saw and used and did not use GE labels in purchasing decisions
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of respondents who observed labels. These groups are 
described in the tree diagram in Fig. 2.
We first estimated the probability of seeing the label using 
a binomial probit model. The first stage model included 
the variables income (dummy = 1 for income greater than 
$50,000), define GMO (dummy = 1 if respondent indi-
cated a transfer of genes that would not occur in nature), 
time period (dummy = 1 for Spring 2017 vs. Fall 2016), 
gender (dummy = 1 for female), education (dummy = 1 for 
Bachelor’s or professional degree), family with children 
(dummy = 1 if household has children under the age of 18 
present), age (continuous), opposition to GMOs used in food 
production (dummy = 1 if opposed or strongly opposed), 
support for GMOs used in food production (dummy = 1 if 
support or strongly support), active seeking of information 
on GMOs (dummy = 1 if seek out information), passively 
seeking information on GMOs (dummy = 1 if pays atten-
tion if it “catches my eye”), use of other types of food labels 
(dummy = 1 if uses “natural” labels; dummy = 1 if uses 
organic labels), uses front of package information (low fat, 
reduced calorie, etc.) (dummy = 1 if yes), consults ingredient 
list (dummy = 1 if yes), and consults nutrition information 
(dummy = 1 if yes).
We next estimated the preference/choice category of the 
respondent with a sample selection/multinomial logit model 
that provided marginal effects at the means (MEMs) which 
accounted for the first stage of whether or not a label had 
been observed.
Results
Column 1 of Table 2 presents results of the first state bino-
mial probit that estimated whether or not the respondent saw 
the label. The variables age, actively seeking information 
on GMOs, passively seeking information on GMOs, and 
consultation of information on the front of packaging were 
significant and negatively associated with seeing a GE label. 
Being above median income, active and passive search, and 
using natural labels increased the probability of seeing the 
label.
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2 present results of the sec-
ond stage multinomial logit model that predicted preference/
choice categories, given a label was seen. The predicted 
group percentages at the mean values of the independent 
variables were 36% for not being influenced by the label, 
49% for using the label to reveal preexisting preferences, 
and 15% for being influenced by the label without a preexist-
ing preference. The model estimates parallel the descriptive 
data: 36% of respondents reported not being influenced by 
the labels they saw, 49% used the label information to reveal 
Table 2  Sample selection model estimates of seeing a GE label and use of label information
N = 942 respondents. Standard errors in parentheses. Multinomial logit with selection computed marginal effects at the mean
***, **, *Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
Variable Binomial probit 
estimate: saw label
Marginal effects of estimates




Income $50,000 or greater 0.070** (0.031) 0.008 (0.145) − 0.025 (0.211) 0.016 (0.168)
“GMO” is transfer of genes that would not occur in nature 0.033 (0.031) − 0.078 (1.904) 0.100 (0.663) − 0.021 (0.267)
Spring data collection − 0.025 (0.030) − 0.090 (0.168) 0.060 (0.138) 0.029 (0.286)
Female − 0.029 (0.030) − 0.168** (0.071) 0.179** (0.066) − 0.010 (0.409)
Bachelor’s/professional degree 0.049 (0.031) 0.005 (2.758) − 0.059 (0.241) 0.053 (0.110)
Family with children − 0.012 (0.034) − 0.059 (0.277) 0.086 (0.190) − 0.026 (0.170)
Age − 0.004*** (0.000) − 0.003 (0.003) 0.005* (0.002) − 0.001 (0.002)
Oppose or strongly oppose GE − 0.019 (0.042) − 0.332*** (0.065) 0.441*** (0.052) − 0.108** (0.050)
Support or strongly support GE 0.027 (0.047) 0.365*** (0.096) − 0.269* (0.159) − 0.095 (0.105)
Active search dummy 0.245*** (0.050) − 0.470*** (0.072) 0.456*** (0.086) 0.013 (1.396)
Passive search dummy 0.131*** (0.039) − 0.437*** (0.064) 0.351*** (0.096) 0.085 (0.158)
Consults product information on front of packaging (low 
fat, reduced calorie, etc.)
− 0.094*** (0.032)
Consults ingredient list 0.026 (0.045)
Consults nutrition information 0.004 (0.044)
Looks for labeling indicating food is organic 0.023 (0.037)
Looks for labeling indicating food is “natural” 0.073** (0.034)
Estimated probability at data means .36 .49 .15
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their preference, and 15% reported being influenced by the 
label.
In the multinomial logit model, gender was significant for 
the first two preference categories. That is, being a female 
was related to a respondent being less likely to not be influ-
enced by the label and more likely to use the label as infor-
mation that helped reveal their preferences through a pur-
chase. Opposition to GE was significant for all three types 
of preference categories at the 1% level. Respondents who 
reported being opposed to the use of GMOs in the produc-
tion of food were more likely to use the label information 
to reveal their preferences through purchase and less likely 
to either not use the label or to use the label as a signal 
that influenced preferences and purchase decisions. Support 
for GE increased the probability of not using the label and 
decreased the probability of the label information being used 
to reveal preference through purchase. Both active and pas-
sive seeking of information significantly decreased the prob-
ability of not using the label and increased the probability of 
using the label as information that helped reveal preferences 
through purchase.
Discussion and conclusion
The answer to our first research question, “did consumers 
see the mandatory GE label?” is yes, in part. More than 
one-third of respondents reported seeing GE label. This 
figure is similar to that found by Christoph et al. (2018) 
for the percentage of participants that used nutrition facts 
labels frequently (31.4%). Of these, about two-thirds of label 
readers used ingredient lists (Christoph et al. 2018). Others 
have reported that about half look for ingredients on labels 
(Ollberding et al. 2011). In the present study, purchase deci-
sions were not affected for about one-third of respondents 
who saw GE labels. An FDA study found that 57% of people 
who don’t use labels “buy what their family likes” (Lin et al. 
2016). Our results are not out of line with other food label 
use. However, while there is a large body of literature about 
characteristics of people who use labels and whether label 
use leads to behavior change, there is scant literature on the 
prevalence of label use with regard to specific ingredient 
characteristics not on the ingredients list, but available else-
where on a food package Thus, there are few comparisons 
that can be made with our results concerning GE label use 
and previous research.
Our second research question was, did labels con-
vey information or change preferences? For about half of 
respondents who saw labels, the label provided informa-
tion on which they based their purchases of GE-contain-
ing or GE-free foods. For about 15% of respondents, the 
label served as a signal that formed preferences and influ-
enced their purchases of GE-containing or GE-free foods. 
Estimates using a multivariate model predicted responses 
that fell into these three categories within 2% points of the 
raw data values.
For about one in eight consumers who saw the label and 
4% of the total sample, the mandatory GE disclosure acted 
as a signal to inform preferences and influence behavior. 
Further, 47.8% of these people used the label to avoid foods 
produced using GE and almost 1.7% used the label to pur-
chase such foods. As noted by Costanigro and Lusk (2014), 
there is little evidence of a negative signaling effect of labels. 
In our study, it was less than 2% of the sample. Lack of sig-
nificant predictor variables for those respondents who did 
not have preexisting preferences suggests that consumers 
whose preferences may be influenced by labels may not be 
easily identified.
For one in two consumers who saw the label, and 15.5% 
of the total sample, labels acted as an information cue. These 
consumers used the label to reveal their preferences. The 
majority of these, 96.5%, desired to avoid foods produced 
using GE, and 3.5% used the information to purchase foods 
produced using GE. Gender (female), age (older), being 
opposed to GE used in food production and actively or pas-
sively searching for information were characteristics that 
increased the probability of using labels as an information 
cue. This indicates that about 15% of consumers will avoid 
GE foods if they are labeled with a simple disclosure.
For more than one in three consumers who saw the label 
and 11% overall, the label was not related to a purchase deci-
sion. Gender (male), being supportive of GE used in food 
production, and not actively or passively searching for infor-
mation were characteristics that increased the probability of 
not using label information.
As the US government moves forward with the imple-
mentation of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure 
Standard, our results show that, for a slight majority of 
respondents who indicated they used the labels with simple 
disclosures, labels were an informational source that helped 
with decision making. For a small percentage of respond-
ents, labels were a signal that influenced preferences and 
purchase behaviors. Simple disclosures on labels are only 
one of five proposed ways to provide consumers with infor-
mation. Websites listing more information, phone numbers 
on packaging to call or text message for product informa-
tion, “scan here for more information”-type QR codes, and 
“Bioengineered” icons are also proposed. This study cannot 
provide any insight into these other disclosure methods. That 
said, because simple disclosures provided the information 
consumers needed to make their purchase decisions, this 
method makes sense. Full information is on the package, 
there is no complexity or extra time or equipment needed 
to access the information, and the information does not act 
as a warning against GE for 96% of consumers included in 
this study.
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Groups supportive and opposed to GM both use argu-
ments based on sustainability, environmentalism, and social 
and economic development, but the exact long-term benefits 
and risks posed by the use of GM remain unclear (Kolodin-
sky 2018; Perry et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016). Additionally, 
while at the present time foods produced using GE have 
not been found to harm health, there is an emergence of 
literature highlighting shortcomings in research about the 
benefits of GE on society (Catacora-Vargas et al. 2018). US 
consumers will be increasingly able to make choices about 
consumption of GE foods with the implementation of man-
datory labeling of products produced using GE, expected in 
2020 (USDA 2018). Consumers need information in order to 
make utility maximizing decisions in the marketplace. Based 
on evidence from the only policy initiative in the US that 
required mandatory GE labels, we conclude that simple dis-
closures work. For those that use labels, simple disclosures 
provide information that aids in decisions that maximize 
consumer utility.
Based on our results, it is unlikely that mandatory GE 
labels with a simple disclosure will cause a collapse of GE 
agricultural production methods, as feared by label oppo-
nents. Instead, they should help markets work more effec-
tively. By providing information, consumers who desire to 
either purchase or avoid GE foods can make decisions that 
meet their needs. This result is similar to that found with 
voluntary rBST free labels; the labels provide information 
for consumers (Kolodinsky 2008). Consumers who do not 
read GE labels will continue to rely on product characteris-
tics that meet their needs.
There are limitations of this study. The data used in this 
study are cross sectional, thus this analysis is limited in the 
extent to which any kinds of causal links can be determined. 
This study was completed in only one US state. As is typical 
with phone surveys, the sample is older and more educated 
than the general population. However, it is important to note 
that telephone surveys still reach a large portion of the popu-
lation (Marken 2018). Despite these limitations, this is the 
only study that we know of examining the signaling effect 
of a mandatory GE labeling policy in the U.S., as Vermont 
has been the only state to implement such a policy.
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